carry one away, that you will think kindly of me." He
then mounted his carriage and drove away to Paris to resume his
conquest of Spain.[204]

The last diplomatic proceeding at Erfurt was the drawing up of a
secret convention which assigned Finland and the Danubian Provinces to
Russia, and promised Russia's help to Napoleon in case Austria should
attack him. The Czar also recognized Joseph Bonaparte as King of Spain
and joined Napoleon in a joint note to George III. summoning him to
make peace. On the same day (October 12th) that note was drawn up and
despatched to London. In reply, Canning stated our willingness to
treat for peace, provided that it should include all parties: that,
although bound by no formal treaty to Ferdinand VII. and the Spanish
people, yet we felt ourselves none the less pledged to them, and
presumed that they, as well as our other allies, would be admitted to
the negotiations. Long before this reply reached Paris, Napoleon had
left for Spain. But on November 19th, he charged Champagny to state
that the Spanish rebels could no more be admitted than the Irish
insurgents: as for the other parties to the dispute he would not
refuse to admit "either the King reigning in Sweden, or the King
reigning in Sicily, or the King reigning in Brazil." This insulting
reply sufficiently shows the insincerity of his overtures and the
peculiarity of his views of monarchy. The Spaniards were rebels
because they refused to recognize the forced abdication of their young
King; and the rulers of Sweden, Naples and Portugal, were Kings as
long as it suited Napoleon to tolerate them, and no longer. It is
needless to add that our Government refused to desert the Spaniards;
and in his reply to St. Petersburg, Canning expressed George III.'s
deep regret that Alexander should sanction

"An usurpation unparalleled in the history of the world.... If
these be the principles to which the Emperor of Russia has
inviolably attached himself ... deeply does His Majesty [George
III.] lament a determination by which the sufferings of Europe
must be aggravated and prolonged. But not to His Majesty is to be
attributed the continuance of the calamities of war, by the
disappointment of all hope of such a peace as would be compatible
with justice and honour."[205]

No open-minded person can peruse the correspondence on this subject
without concluding that British policy, if lacking the breadth, grip
and _f