empire which, he assured O'Meara at St.
Helena, held the first place in his thoughts after the overthrow of
Austria. But it was not in his nature to make the needful concessions.
"_I must follow my policy in a geometrical line_" he said to
Lucchesini. England might have Hanover and a few colonies if she would
let Sicily go to a Bonaparte: as for Prussia, she might absorb
half-a-dozen neighbouring princelings.

That is the gist of Napoleon's European policy in the summer of 1806;
and the surprise which he expressed to Mollien at the rejection of his
offers is probably genuine. Sensitive to the least insult himself, his
bluntness of perception respecting the honour of others might almost
qualify him to rank with Aristotle's man devoid of feeling. It is
perfectly true that he did not make war on Prussia in 1806 any more
than on England in 1803. He only made peace impossible.[99]

The condition on which Prussia now urgently insisted was the entire
evacuation of Germany by French troops. This Napoleon refused to
concede until Frederick William demobilized his army, a step that
would have once more humbled him in the eyes of this people. It might
even have led to his dethronement. For an incident had just occurred
in Bavaria that fanned German sentiment to a flame. A bookseller of
Nuremberg, named Palm, was proved by French officers to have sold an
anonymous pamphlet entitled "Germany in her deep Humiliation." It was
by no means of a revolutionary type, and the worthy man believed it to
be a mistake when he was arrested by the military authorities. He was
wrong. Napoleon had sent orders that a terrible example must be made
in order to stop the sale of patriotic German pamphlets. Palm was
therefore haled away to Braunau, an Austrian town then held by French
troops, was tried by martial law and shot (August 25th). Never did the
Emperor commit a greater blunder. The outrage sent a thrill of
indignation through the length and breadth of Germany. Instead of
quenching, it inflamed the national sentiment, and thus rendered
doubly difficult any peaceful compromise between Frederick William and
Napoleon. The latter was now looked upon as a tyrant by the citizen
class which his reforms were designed to conciliate: and Frederick
William became almost the champion of Germany when he demanded the
withdrawal of the French troops.

Unfortunately, the King refused to appoint Ministers who inspired
confidence. With Hardenberg in place of H