ms already pressing on the Executive.
Whether the President actually entertained any such intention or not,
it would have been a logical development of his theory of the Chief
Executive as Premier. But the President-Premier had received a vote of
confidence, and was free to deal with the new situation created by the
various peace proposals of the Winter of 1916-1917. The negotiations
which followed during December and January were obscure at the time and
are by no means clear even yet. The fullest account of them is that of
Bernstorff, whose personal interest in vindicating himself would make
him a somewhat unreliable witness even if there were nothing else
against him. And at the time, when the President's motives were unknown
to a public which had not his advantage of information as to what was
going to happen in Europe, almost every step which he took was
misconstrued, and his occasional infelicities of language aroused
suspicions which later events have shown to be entirely unjustified.
Reports of American diplomats in the Fall of 1916 indicated that the
party in Germany which favored unrestricted submarine war without
consideration for neutrals was growing in strength. It was opposed by
most of the civilian officials of the Government, including the
Chancellor, Bethmann Hollweg; Jagow and Zimmermann, the successive
Foreign Secretaries, and Bernstorff, the Ambassador in Washington. But
the Admirals who supported it were gradually winning over the
all-powerful Generals Hindenburg and Ludendorff, and it appeared only a
question of time until the promise to America of May, 1916, should be
broken. And, as Bernstorff has expressed it, the President realized
after the Sussex note there could be no more notes; any future German
aggression would have to be met by action or endured with meekness.
In these circumstances the President was driven to seek opportunity for
the mediation which he had been ready to offer, if asked, from the very
beginning of the war. But to offer mediation, so long as the war was
undecided, was a matter of extreme delicacy. The majority of
intelligent Americans were strong partisans of the allied cause and
firmly believed that that cause was bound to win in the long run. There
was a minority which had equal sympathy for Germany and equal
confidence in her ultimate success. To offer mediation while the war
was still undecided would have been to offend both of these elements,
as well as the warring
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