he Italians holding the Austrian
outpost positions they had taken during June and July; but the
Austrian main defenses from one end of the frontier to the other, a
distance of more than 300 miles, were virtually intact. It must be
borne in mind, however, that the Italian General Staff at this period
of the war never contemplated any general offensive except on the
Isonzo River. Although their attack along the Isonzo did not attain
its object of reducing the main defenses of Trieste and Gorizia,
proved too hard a nut to crack, the Italians here won a series of
minor victories against great odds and, to the Italian mind at least,
demonstrated the valor of the army and the effectiveness of the new
artillery which boded well for the future.

It has been pointed out that in these operations General Cadorna had
to consider other things besides the immediate problems facing his
troops. The Italo-Austrian warfare was but a small factor in the great
plan of the Entente allies, who as the war progressed, realized more
and more the importance of cooperative action. All that happened in
Galicia, Poland, Lithuania and Courland had a direct influence upon
Cadorna's plans. Russian reverses and the failure of all attempts by
the French and British to break the German line in France and Belgium
made the Italian commander cautious. The series of Teutonic victories
made it possible that at any time he might have to face an
overwhelming host of Austrians and Germans equipped with artillery
which he could not hope to equal and backed by an apparently limitless
supply of ammunition. For political reasons, also, he could not risk,
even in the hope of reaching Trieste, sacrificing his men in an
offensive costing anything like the quantities of human material being
used up each day in other theatres. His preponderance of troops at the
opening of operations in May was gradually reduced. But the enemy's
positions and his superior artillery offset the Italian's greater
numbers. On the whole it may be said that the Italians accomplished
quite as much as any of their allies. They penetrated farther into the
Alps and the rugged tableland west of Trieste than the British and
French with their colonials did into the hills of Gallipoli or into
the ridge of the Lille region, and the length of their thrusts was
greater than the French advances in Artois and Champagne.

The Italians were more successful in concealing the extent of their
losses than most