nd back to Alexandria went the whole fleet of transports, with the
exception of a few vessels carrying the Australian Infantry Brigade,
which, by some miracle, had been properly loaded.
When General Hamilton and his soldiers sailed out of Mudros Harbor,
bound for Alexandria, Admiral de Robeck came to a momentous and
historic decision. Acting either on his own responsibility or under
orders or advice of some superior authority, he decided not to wait
for the troops, but to make a determined attack upon the Narrows with
his whole fleet. By sheer weight of guns he would try to run past the
great forts that lined the 1,500-yard channel, pounding his way
through on the theory that "what will not bend must break."
March 18, 1915, was an ideal day for such an heroic attempt. The
sailors of the allied fleet were called to quarters as the morning
sun, in a perfect sky, arose over the towering hills that lined the
straits. Briefly the officers addressed the men, told them of the work
ahead, spoke of the glory that awaited them if successful, and ordered
each man to his post.
The reader, in order to gain some definite idea of the defenses that
were to be attacked, should take up a map showing the Dardanelles. He
will find, about ten miles from the entrance, a narrow channel where
the shores of Asia and Europe almost touch. There, at the narrowest
point of the channel, the Turks had built their chief defenses. On the
south slope of the Kalid Bahr were three powerful works. The Rumeli
Medjidieh Battery mounted two 11-inch, four 9.4-inch, and five
3.4-inch guns. The Hamidieh II Battery had two 14-inch, while the
Namazieh Battery had one 11-inch, one 10.2-inch, eleven 9.4-inch,
three 8.2-inch, and three 5.9-inch guns.
On the Asiatic side of the Narrows, near Chanak, was a system of
redoubts of equal strength. The Hamidieh I Battery, south of Chanak,
consisted of two 14-inch and seven 9.4-inch guns, while the Hamidieh
III Battery possessed two 14-inch, one 9.4-inch, one 8.2-inch, and
four 5.9-inch guns.
Besides all these formidable defenses there were many minor positions
on the very edge of the Narrows. In fact the whole channel, and the
way of the allied fleet to the Sea of Marmora, lay through rows upon
rows of high-power guns.
The disastrous naval attack upon the big forts at the Narrows,
resulting, as it did, in the loss of three battleships and the
disabling of others, convinced the British and French naval
authorit
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