ough much of the early
fighting in the western theatre, originally commanding the Eleventh
Brigade of the Third Corps of General French's army. His appointment
to the Dardanelles was in the nature of a promotion, it being
recognized that his dash and energy would be useful in the style of
warfare that would govern the battle for the straits.
In addition to the regular troops brought out from England, there was
the Naval Division. This force had seen a bit of action in the attempt
to save Antwerp. It consisted of two Naval Brigades and a Royal Marine
Brigade.
Also there was a Territorial Division, known as the East Lancashires,
under the command of Major General Douglas. Immediately upon the
outbreak of war this division had volunteered for foreign service and
had been shipped to Egypt, where it had had six months' training. It
comprised the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Lancashire Fusiliers,
the Fourth and Fifth East Lancashires, the Ninth and Tenth
Manchesters, the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Manchesters.
These troops, with the inclusion of the Australian and New Zealand
forces brought to Egypt at the beginning of the war, under the command
of Lieutenant General Birdwood, and a considerable number of Indian
troops, made up the force at the disposal of Sir Ian Hamilton. They
numbered in all, with the French troops, about 120,000 men.
What had the Turkish authorities to set against this army, supported
by the great fleet of battleships and unlimited number of transports
and subsidiary vessels? Estimates of the potential strength of the
Turkish army available for service in and about the Gallipoli
Peninsula at this time vary widely. There were those, for instance,
who claimed that, if necessary, the Turks could command at least
600,000 troops for the defense of the straits, and that any attempt to
capture the positions with the force supplied to Sir Ian Hamilton was
doomed to failure. On the other hand were those who claimed that the
Turks were short of equipment and ammunition, and had no means of
replenishment; that they had no heart in the fight; that they were
already in revolt against their German taskmasters; that the Suez and
Caucasus defeats had undermined their morale and depleted their
numbers, and that the Turkish high command had decided that it was
useless to attempt to defend the position. Fortunately, between these
two extremists there was a happy mean, and the best evidence points to
the
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