ebruary 5 by about 600 Germans, well
equipped with Maxims and machine guns. They were beaten off after a
short engagement with a loss of nine men killed, twenty-two wounded,
and fifteen taken prisoners. On the Union side the casualties were one
killed, and two wounded.

On February 22, 1915, General Botha's army being ready, he moved out
of Swakopmund, and on the following day occupied the stations of
Nonidas and Goanikontes, meeting with only slight resistance. Nearly a
month was now spent in preparing for the advance on the capital,
Windhoek. Careful reconnoitering of the enemy's positions was made,
and an advanced base was established.

On the night of March 19, 1915, two mounted brigades left the post at
Husab to clear the railway line. General Botha accompanied the first
brigade, which was commanded by Colonel Brits, their object being
Riet, an important place south of the railway, where it was known that
the enemy was strongly prepared. Riet was of utmost importance to the
Union force for it commanded the highway to Windhoek. It was planned
that while Colonel Brits's brigade attacked Riet the Bloemhof
Commando was to execute a flank movement and seizing Schwarze Kopje to
endeavor to cut off the enemy's retreat.

At daybreak on March 20, 1915, the brigade reached the German
position. The right rested on the Swakop stream; the left on the
foothills of Langer Heinrichberg, while the artillery was effectively
placed so as to command the river and highway. Assisted by the guns of
the Transvaal Horse Artillery a frontal attack was made, and the
fighting became general. With varying fortunes it continued until the
evening when the Germans were finally driven out and dispersed.

The second brigade commanded by Colonel Celliers had been directed to
cut the railway line between Jakalswater and Sphinx. He was to attack
the former place after blocking the way, in case any reenforcements
should be sent by the enemy from Windhoek. Celliers succeeded in
cutting the railway and seized a train containing supplies for the
Germans, but his attack on Jakalswater was a failure, and the enemy
made forty-three of his men prisoners.

General Botha was so confident of the ultimate success of his
campaign, that he was not disposed to imperil his chances by any hasty
operations, and so his progress toward Windhoek was at first
necessarily slow. The nature of the country afforded the enemy many
natural advantages and unfortunately the