the capture of Warsaw seven huge armies had been employed. The
German northern army, operating against the double-track line which
runs from Warsaw to Petrograd, 1,000 miles in the northeast, via
Bielostok and Grodno; the army operating in the Suwalki district,
threatening the same line farther west; the army aimed at the Narew
based on Mearva; the army directly aimed at Warsaw, north of the
Vistula; the (Ninth) army directly aimed at Warsaw, south of the
Vistula; ten or twelve Austrian army corps attempting to reach the
single-and double-track railway from Ivangorod to Brest-Litovsk and
Moscow, and the line from Warsaw to Kiev via Lublin and Cholm, which
is for the most part a single track, and, finally, the army of Von
Linsingen, operating on the Lipa east of Lemberg.

The campaign for Warsaw had been fought along a front of 1,000 miles,
extending from the Baltic to the frontier of Rumania. An estimate
which lays claim to being based upon authoritative figures placed the
number of men engaged in almost daily conflict on this long line at
between 6,000,000 and 7,000,000. The attacks upon the sides of the
lines on which the defense of Warsaw depended had been the most
furious in the course of the war on the eastern front. The losses on
both sides undoubtedly were enormous, though they can be ascertained
only with difficulty, if at all.

The following summary of captures was issued by the German Great
Headquarters on August 1, 1915: "Captured in July between the Baltic
and the Pilica, 95,023 Russians; 41 guns, including two heavy ones; 4
mine throwers; 230 machine guns. Taken in July in the southeastern
theatre of war (apparently between Pilica and the Rumanian frontier):
323 officers; 75,719 men; 10 guns; 126 machine guns."

PART VIII--THE BALKANS

CHAPTER LXI

DIPLOMACY IN THE BALKANS

In discussing the causes of the Great War in Vol. I we have already
shown how important a part the little Balkan States played in the long
chain of events leading up to the final catastrophe. When two mighty
lords come to blows over the right of way through the fields of their
peasant neighbors, it is only natural that the peasants themselves
should be deeply concerned. While it is not likely that any of them
would feel especially friendly toward either of the belligerents, it
might, however, be to their advantage to take a hand in the struggle
on the side of the victor. But until each thought he had picked the
win