d that he thereby had revived the courage
of the dejected Romans. Being now resolutely bent to come, as soon as
possible, to a decisive battle, he thought it proper, for decency's sake,
to consult Scipio, whom he found of a quite different opinion from
himself. Scipio represented, that in case time should be allowed for
disciplining the new levies during the winter, they would be much fitter
for service in the ensuing campaign; that the Gauls, who were naturally
fickle and inconstant, would disengage themselves insensibly from
Hannibal; that as soon as his wounds should be healed, his presence might
be of some use in an affair of such general concern: in a word, he
besought him earnestly not to proceed any further.

These reasons, though so just, made no impression upon Sempronius. He saw
himself at the head of sixteen thousand Romans, and twenty thousand
allies, exclusive of cavalry, (a number which, in those ages, formed a
complete army,) when both consuls joined their forces. The troops of the
enemy amounted to near the same number. He thought the juncture extremely
favourable for him. He declared publicly, that all the officers and
soldiers were desirous of a battle, except his colleague, whose mind (he
observed) being more affected by his wound than his body, could not, for
that reason, bear to hear of an engagement. But still, continued
Sempronius, is it just to let the whole army droop and languish with him?
What could Scipio expect more? Did he flatter himself with the hopes that
a third consul, and a new army, would come to his assistance? Such were
the expressions he employed both among the soldiers, and even about
Scipio's tent. The time for the election of new generals drawing near,
Sempronius was afraid a successor would be sent before he had put an end
to the war; and therefore it was his opinion, that he ought to take
advantage of his colleague's illness, to secure the whole honour of the
victory to himself. As he had no regard, says Polybius, to the time proper
for action, and only to that which he thought suited his own interest, he
could not fail of taking wrong measures. He therefore ordered his army to
prepare for battle.

This was the very thing Hannibal desired; as he held it for a maxim, that
a general who has entered a foreign country, or one possessed by the
enemy, and has formed some great design, has no other refuge left, than
continually to raise the expectations of his allies by some fresh