t proofs, so renowned a general, who in the rest
of his conduct was never wanting, either in prudence to make choice of the
best expedients, or in readiness to put his designs in execution. They,
besides, are inclined to judge favourably of him, from the authority, or
at least the silence, of Polybius, who, speaking of the memorable
consequences of this celebrated battle, says, that the Carthaginians were
firmly persuaded, that they should possess themselves of Rome at the first
assault; but then he does not mention how this could possibly have been
effected, as that city was very populous, warlike, strongly fortified, and
defended with a garrison of two legions; nor does he any where give the
least hint that such a project was feasible, or that Hannibal did wrong in
not attempting to put it in execution.

And indeed, if we examine matters more narrowly, we shall find, that
according to the common maxims of war it could not be undertaken. It is
certain, that Hannibal's whole infantry, before the battle, amounted but
to forty thousand men; and, as six thousand of these had been slain in the
action, and doubtless, many more wounded and disabled, there could remain
but six or seven and twenty thousand foot fit for service; now this number
was not sufficient to invest so large a city as Rome, which had a river
running through it; nor to attack it in form, because they had neither
engines, ammunition, nor any other things necessary for carrying on a
siege. For want of these, Hannibal, even after his victory at Thrasymenus,
miscarried in his attempt upon Spoletum;(772) and soon after the battle of
Cannae, was forced to raise the siege of a little city,(773) of no note,
and of no great strength. It cannot be denied, but that had he miscarried
on the present occasion, nothing less could have been expected but that he
must have been irrecoverably lost. However, to form a just judgment of
this matter, a man ought to be a soldier, and a soldier, perhaps, of those
times. This is an old dispute, on which none but those who are perfectly
well skilled in the art of war should pretend to give their opinion.

Soon after the battle of Cannae, Hannibal had despatched his brother Mago
to Carthage, with the news of his victory, and at the same time to demand
succours, in order that he might be enabled to put an end to the war.(774)
Mago, on his arrival, made, in full senate, a lofty speech, in which he
extolled his brother's exploits, and di