er the battle of Cannae. For this delay,(780) says Livy, might seem only
to have retarded his victory; whereas this last misconduct rendered him
absolutely incapable of ever defeating the enemy. In a word, as Marcellus
observed judiciously afterwards, Capua was to the Carthaginians and their
general, what Cannae(781) had been to the Romans. There their martial
genius, their love of discipline, were lost: there their former fame, and
their almost certain hopes of future glory, vanished at once. And, indeed,
from thenceforth the affairs of Hannibal advanced to their decline by
swift steps; fortune declared in favour of prudence, and victory seemed
now reconciled to the Romans.

I know not whether Livy has just ground to impute all these fatal
consequences to the delicious abode of Capua. If we examine carefully all
the circumstances of this history, we shall scarce be able to persuade
ourselves, that the little progress which was afterwards made by the arms
of Hannibal, ought to be ascribed to his wintering at Capua. It might,
indeed, have been one cause, but a very inconsiderable one: and the
bravery with which the forces of Hannibal afterwards defeated the armies
of consuls and praetors; the towns they took even in sight of the Romans;
their maintaining their conquests so vigorously, and staying fourteen
years after this in Italy, in spite of the Romans: all these circumstances
may induce us to believe, that Livy lays too great a stress on the
delights of Capua.

The real cause of the decline of Hannibal's affairs, was owing to his want
of necessary recruits and succours from Carthage. After Mago's speech, the
Carthaginian senate had judged it necessary,(782) in order for the
carrying on the conquests in Italy, to send thither a considerable
reinforcement of Numidian horse, forty elephants, and a thousand talents;
and to hire, in Spain, twenty thousand foot, and four thousand horse, to
reinforce their armies in Spain and Italy. Nevertheless, Mago could obtain
an order but for twelve thousand foot, and two thousand five hundred
horse:(783) and even when he was just going to march to Italy with this
reinforcement, so much inferior to that which had been promised him, he
was countermanded and sent to Spain. So that Hannibal, after these mighty
promises, had neither infantry, cavalry, elephants, nor money sent him;
but was left to depend upon his own personal resources. His army was now
reduced to twenty-six thousand foot,