f the moral virtues seem not to belong to the active life.

But a man can, by acts of all the moral virtues, lead his
neighbour to good works by his example; and this S. Gregory here
attributes to the active life.

3. Lastly, the moral virtues dispose us to the contemplative life. But
disposition to a thing and the perfect attainment of that thing come
under the same head. Consequently the moral virtues do not belong to the
active life.

But just as a virtue which is directed towards the end of
another virtue passes over, in some sort, into the species of
that latter virtue, so also when a man uses those things which
belong to the active life precisely as disposing him to
contemplation, then those things which he so uses are comprised
under the contemplative life. But for those who devote
themselves to the works of the moral virtues as being good in
themselves and not as dispositive towards the contemplative
life, the moral virtues belong to the active life. Although at
the same time it might be said that the active life is a
disposition to the contemplative life.

"O death, how bitter is the remembrance of thee to a man that
hath peace in his possessions, to a man that is at rest, and
whose ways are prosperous in all things, and that is yet able to
take meat! O death, thy sentence is welcome to the man that is
in need, and to him whose strength faileth, who is in a decrepit
age, and that is in care about all things, and to the
distrustful that loseth patience! Fear not the sentence of
death. Remember what things have been before thee, and what
shall come after thee: this sentence is from the Lord upon all
flesh. And what shall come upon thee by the good pleasure of the
Most High whether ten, or a hundred, or a thousand years."[414]

II

Does Prudence pertain to the Active Life?

The Philosopher says[415] that prudence pertains to active happiness,
and to this pertain the moral virtues.

As we have said above, when one thing is directed towards the attainment
of another thing as its end, it--and this especially holds good in
morals--is, so to speak, drawn into the species of that towards which it
is thus directed, thus: "He who commits adultery in order to steal" says
the Philosopher,[416] "is rather a thief than an adulterer." Now it is
clear that that knowledge which is prudence is directed to the acts of
t