gustine says,[483] the higher
reason, which is destined for contemplation, is compared to the lower
reason, which is destined for action, as man is compared to woman--she
is to be governed by him.

But secondly, one thing may be prior to another as far as we are
concerned, it may, that is, precede it in the way of generation. And in
this sense the active life precedes the contemplative, for it conduces
to it, as we have already said. In the order of generation disposition
to a nature precedes that nature, though that nature is, simply speaking
and considered in itself, prior to the disposition to it.

But some maintain that the active life does not precede the
contemplative, thus:

1. The contemplative life is directly concerned with the love of God,
the active life with the love of our neighbour. But love of God precedes
love of our neighbour, for we have to love our neighbour for God's sake.

But the contemplative life is not concerned with merely any kind
of love of God, but with the perfect love of Him; the active
life, on the contrary, is necessary for any kind of love of our
neighbour, for S. Gregory says[484]: "Without the contemplative
life men can gain admittance to their heavenly home if they have
not neglected the good works they could have done; but they
cannot enter without the active life, if they neglect the good
works they could do." Whence it appears that the active life
precedes the contemplative in the sense that that which is
common to everybody precedes in the order of generation that
which is peculiar to the perfect.

2. Again, S. Gregory says[485]: "You must know that just as the right
procedure is for a man to pass from the active to the contemplative
life; so, too, it is often profitable to the soul to return to the
active life." Consequently the active life is not absolutely speaking
prior to the contemplative.

But while we proceed from the active life to the contemplative
by way of generation, we return from the contemplative to the
active by way of direction, in order, that is, that our active
life may be directed by the contemplative; just in the same way
as habits are generated by acts and then, as is said in the
_Ethics_, when the habit is formed we act still more
perfectly.[486]

3. Lastly, things which accord with different characters do not seem to
be necessarily related. But the active and contemplative l