f accounting for everything, it would be necessary to take a
very wide view of natural history and botany, which it is quite
impossible for us to attempt. But this is not necessary for our purpose.
We are perfectly justified in selecting certain topics which must arise
in the discussion. If, in studying these points, we find that _there_ at
least the intervention of a Controlling Power becomes necessary, and the
absence of it leaves things without any reasonable explanation, then we
shall have good and logical ground for holding to our faith in the
universal presence of such a Power. No chain is stronger than its
weakest link. If secondary causes cannot succeed at any one part of the
chain, it is obvious that they fail as a universal explanation.
This part of the work has already been done far better than I could do
it. In the first eight chapters of Mivart's "Genesis of Species" [1] the
argument has been ably and clearly put, and whatever answer is possible
has been given by Darwin and others; so that the world may judge. All
that can here be usefully attempted, is, by way of reminder, to
reproduce some main topics on which no real answer has been given. These
are selected, partly because they are less abstruse and difficult to
follow than some which might be dealt with, partly because they are
calculated to awaken our interest, and partly because the conclusion in
favour of a continual Providence; working through organized law and
system, appears to follow most clearly from them.
[Footnote 1: Second Edition, 1871.]
The points I would call attention to are the following:--
(I) That as natural selection will only maintain changes that have been
_beneficial_ to the creature, it is contrary to such a law, if acting
entirely by itself, that that there should be developments (not being
mere accidental deformities, &c.) disadvantageous to the creature. And
yet the world is full of such.
(2) That there are forms which cannot be accounted for on the
evolutionist supposition, that they were gradually obtained by a series
of small changes slowly progressing towards a perfect structure. They
would be of no use at all unless produced _at once and complete_.
(3) That natural selection, as apart from a Divine Designer, altogether
fails to account for _beauty_, as distinguished from mere brilliancy or
conspicuousness, in nature. Whereas, if we suppose the existence of a
beneficent Creator, who has moral objects in view,
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