to reach or an external guidance in the processes?

CHAPTER VI.

_THE MARKS OF CREATIVE INTELLIGENCE IN THE EVOLUTION OF ORGANIC FORMS_.

The heading of this chapter does not mark a new departure, for we have
been tracing existing forms of matter from the first, and have already
seen the necessity of believing in Creative Intelligence and Guidance.
We have seen that inorganic matter, with what we call its molecular or
atomic structure, cannot be reasonably regarded as self-caused; and we
have concluded with Sir J.F.W. Herschell that the sight of such a
well-arranged army, performing its evolutions in a regular and uniform
manner, irresistibly suggests a great Commander and Designer. We have
further found that the advent of LIFE demands a Power _ab extra_. We
have called attention to the gap, between plant and animal, which is
ignored or made light of, chiefly on account of the close approach of
the two kingdoms. But there is one broad distinction, namely, that of
elementary reason and no reason, or of consciousness and
unconsciousness, which is, in itself, a sufficient difficulty to pull
us up shortly. We have not yet fully considered this matter, because it
will come more appropriately at a later stage, and in the _a fortiori_
form. But we have justly noted it here. We cannot account for the most
elementary reason by any physical change; there is no analogy between
the two. The connection of mind and matter is unexplainable; and no
theory of development of physical form can say why, at any given stage,
physical development begins to be accompanied by brain-power and
_consciousness_. Admit candidly that the addition of intelligence at a
certain stage, however mysteriously interwoven with structural
accompaniments, is a gift _ab extra_, and we have at least a reasonable
and so far satisfactory explanation.

But when we have got an animal form, however simple and elementary, with
at least a recognizable "potentiality" of intelligence, we enter, as I
said, a long stretch of apparently smooth water, over which, for an
important part of our passage, we seem able to glide without any
difficulty from the necessary intervention of the so-called
supernatural. I have, then, to show that even here there is really no
possibility of dispensing with a Creator who has a purpose, a designed
scheme, and a series of type-forms to be complied with.

In order to fully exhaust the question how far natural selection is
capable o