ty, and the man obeyed. He then called
out the remaining six men of the guard, including the lieutenant who
was in charge, and put them under arrest, ordering them to pile
their arms, which they did. He then marched them down the road a
short distance where his own men were concealed, and secured all of
them, and their arms and horses, without resistance.

In an engagement Morgan is perfectly cool, and yet his face and
action are as if surcharged with electricity. He has the quickness
of a tiger, and the strength of two ordinary men. One cause of his
success is found in the character of his chargers. He has only the
fleetest and most enduring horses; and when one fails he soon finds
another by hook or by crook. His business in his recent raid into
Kentucky (July 28th), seemed to have been mainly to gather up the
best blooded horses, in which that State abounds.

Unless in some fortunate hour for the loyal cause he should fall
into the hands of the Federal forces, Colonel John H. Morgan will
become one of the most potent and dangerous men in the Rebel
service.

So far as my observation extended, the Southern cavalry are superior
to the loyal, for the kind of service expected of them. They are not
relied upon for heavy charges against large bodies of infantry
closely massed, as in some of the wars of the Old World during the
close of the last century and the first part of this; but for
scouting, foraging, and sudden dashes against outposts and unguarded
companies of their enemies. In this service, fleetness, perfect
docility, and endurance for a few hours or a day, are requisite in
the make-up of the horses used. And in these traits Morgan's blooded
horses are admirable. And then, with the exception of some of the
Western troopers, the Southerners are more perfect horsemen than our
loyal cavalry. They have been on horseback, many of them, from
youth, and are trained to the perfect control of themselves and
their steeds in difficult circumstances. In addition to these causes
of superiority, they have a vast advantage over the Federal troops
in the present contest from two causes: It is hard to overestimate
the advantage they find in a knowledge of the ground, the roads, the
ravines, the hiding-places, the marshes, the fords, the forests, &c.
But even more important than this is the sympathy they have from the
inhabitants, almost universally, who give them information by every
method, of the approach, strength, and plan