uppose a contract to be made between two persons cast ashore on an
uninhabited territory, or in a place over which no law of society
extends. There are such places, and contracts have been made by
individuals casually there, and these contracts have been enforced in
courts of law in civilized communities. Whence do such contracts derive
their obligation, if not from universal law?

If these considerations show us that the obligation of a lawful contract
does not derive its force from the particular law of the place where
made, but may exist where that law does not exist, and be enforced
where that law has no validity, then it follows, we contend, that any
statute which diminishes or lessens its obligation does impair it,
whether it precedes or succeeds the contract in date. The contract
having an independent origin, whenever the law comes to exist together
with it, and interferes with it, it lessens, we say, and impairs, its
own original and independent obligation. In the case before the court,
the contract did not owe its existence to the particular law of New
York; it did not depend on that law, but could be enforced without the
territory of that State, as well as within it. Nevertheless, though
legal, though thus independently existing, though thus binding the party
everywhere, and capable of being enforced everywhere, yet the statute of
New York says that it shall be discharged without payment. This, we say,
impairs the obligation of that contract. It is admitted to have been
legal in its inception, legal in its full extent, and capable of being
enforced by other tribunals according to its terms. An act, then,
purporting to discharge it without payment, is, as we contend, an act
impairing its obligation.

Here, however, we meet the opposite argument, stated on different
occasions in different terms, but usually summed up in this, that the
law itself is a part of the contract, and therefore cannot impair it.
What does this mean? Let us seek for clear ideas. It does not mean that
the law gives any particular construction to the terms of the contract,
or that it makes the promise, or the consideration, or the time of
performance, other than is expressed in the instrument itself. It can
only mean, that it is to be taken as a part of the contract, or
understanding of the parties, that the contract itself shall be enforced
by such laws and regulations, respecting remedy and for the enforcement
of contracts, as are in bei