n or sale of goods awarded, not
in performance of the contract, or as part of the contract, but as an
indemnity for the breach of the contract. Even interest, which is a
strong case, where it is not expressed in the contract itself, can only
be given as damages. It is all but absurd to say that a man's goods are
sold on a _fieri facias_, or that he himself goes to jail, in pursuance
of his contract. These are the penalties which the law inflicts for the
breach of his contract. Doubtless, parties, when they enter into
contracts, may well consider both what their rights and what their
liabilities will be by the law, if such contracts be broken; but this
contemplation of consequences which can ensue only when the contract is
broken, is no part of the contract itself. The law has nothing to do
with the contract till it be broken; how, then, can it be said to form a
part of the contract itself?

But there are other cogent and more specific reasons against considering
the law as part of the contract. (1.) If the law be part of the
contract, it cannot be repealed or altered; because, in such case, the
repealing or modifying law itself would impair the obligation of the
contract. The insolvent law of New York, for example, authorizes the
discharge of a debtor on the consent of two thirds of his creditors. A
subsequent act requires the consent of three fourths; but if the
existing law be part of the contract, this latter law would be void. In
short, nothing which is part of the contract can be varied but by
consent of the parties; therefore the argument runs _in absurdum_; for
it proves that no laws for enforcing the contract, or giving remedies
upon it, or any way affecting it, can be changed or modified between its
creation and its end. If the law in question binds one party on the
ground of assent to it, it binds both, and binds them until they agree
to terminate its operation. (2.) If the party be bound by an implied
assent to the law, as thereby making the law a part of the contract, how
would it be if the parties had expressly dissented, and agreed that the
law should make no part of the contract? Suppose the promise to have
been, that the promisor would pay at all events, and not take advantage
of the statute; still, would not the statute operate on the whole,--on
this particular agreement and all? and does not this show that the law
is no part of the contract, but something above it? (3.) If the law of
the place be part