y be presumed to be
there for an innocent purpose; he may have crept silently there to hear
the news, or from mere curiosity to see what was going on.[2]
Preposterous, absurd! Such an idea shocks all common sense. A man is
found to be a conspirator to commit a murder; he has planned it; he has
assisted in arranging the time, the place and the means; and he is found
in the place, and at the time, and yet it is suggested that he might
have been there, not for co-operation and concurrence, but from
curiosity! Such an argument deserves no answer. It would be difficult to
give it one, in decorous terms. Is it not to be taken for granted, that
a man seeks to accomplish his own purposes? When he has planned a
murder, and is present at its execution, is he there to forward or to
thwart his own design? is he there to assist, or there to prevent? But
"Curiosity"! He may be there from mere "curiosity"! Curiosity to witness
the success of the execution of his own plan of murder! The very walls
of a court-house ought not to stand, the ploughshare should run through
the ground it stands on, where such an argument could find
toleration.[3]
It is not necessary that the abettor should actually lend a hand, that
he should take a part in the act itself; if he be present ready to
assist, that is assisting. Some of the doctrines advanced would acquit
the defendant, though he had gone to the bedchamber of the deceased,
though he had been standing by when the assassin gave the blow. This is
the argument we have heard to-day.
The court here said, they did not so understand the argument of the
counsel for defendant. Mr. Dexter said, "The intent and power alone
must co-operate."
No doubt the law is, that being ready to assist is assisting, if the
party has the power to assist, in case of need. It is so stated by
Foster, who is a high authority. "If A happeneth to be present at a
murder, for instance, and taketh no part in it, nor endeavoreth to
prevent it, nor apprehendeth the murderer, nor levyeth hue and cry after
him, this strange behavior of his, though highly criminal, will not of
itself render him either principal or accessory." "But if a fact
amounting to murder should be committed in prosecution of some unlawful
purpose, though it were but a bare trespass, to which A in the case last
stated had consented, and he had gone in order to give assistance, if
need were, for carrying it into execution, this would have amount
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