of the contract, one of its terms and conditions, how
could it be enforced, as we all know it might be, in another
jurisdiction, which should have no regard to the law of the place?
Suppose the parties, after the contract, to remove to another State, do
they carry the law with them as part of their contract? We all know they
do not. Or take a common case. Some States have laws abolishing
imprisonment for debt; these laws, according to the argument, are all
parts of the contract; how, then, can the party, when sued in another
State, be imprisoned contrary to the terms of his contract? (4.) The
argument proves too much, inasmuch as it applies as strongly to prior as
to subsequent contracts. It is founded on a supposed assent to the
exercise of legislative authority, without considering whether that
exercise be legal or illegal. But it is equally fair to found the
argument on an implied assent to the potential exercise of that
authority. The implied reference to the control of legislative power is
as reasonable and as strong when that power is dormant, as while it is
in exercise. In one case, the argument is, "The law existed, you knew
it, and acquiesced." In the other it is, "The power to pass the law
existed, you knew it, and took your chance." There is as clear an assent
in one instance as in the other. Indeed, it is more reasonable and more
sensible to imply a general assent to all the laws of society, present
and to come, from the fact of living in it, than it is to imply a
particular assent to a particular existing enactment. The true view of
the matter is, that every man is presumed to submit to all power which
may be lawfully exercised over him or his right, and no one should be
presumed to submit to illegal acts of power, whether actual or
contingent. (5.) But a main objection to this argument is, that it would
render the whole constitutional provision idle and inoperative; and no
explanatory words, if such words had been added in the Constitution,
could have prevented this consequence. The law, it is said, is part of
the contract; it cannot, therefore, impair the contract, because a
contract cannot impair itself. Now, if this argument be sound, the case
would have been the same, whatever words the Constitution had used. If,
for example, it had declared that no State should pass any law impairing
contracts _prospectively_ or _retrospectively_; or any law impairing
contracts, whether existing or future; or, whatever
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