the
exclusion of everybody else.

But the waters of New York are no more the subject of exclusive grants
by that State, than the waters of other States are subjects of such
grants by those other States. Virginia may well exercise, over the
entrance of the Chesapeake, all the power that New York can exercise
over the bay of New York, and the waters on her shores. The Chesapeake,
therefore, upon the principle of these laws, may be the subject of State
monopoly; and so may the bay of Massachusetts. But this is not all. It
requires no greater power to grant a monopoly of trade, than a monopoly
of navigation. Of course, New York, if these acts can be maintained, may
give an exclusive right of entry of vessels into her ports; and the
other States may do the same. These are not extreme cases. We have only
to suppose that other States should do what New York has already done,
and that the power should be carried to its full extent.

To all this, no answer is to be given but one, that the concurrent power
of the States, concurrent though it be, is yet subordinate to the
legislation of Congress; and that therefore Congress may, whenever it
pleases, annul the State legislation; but until it does so annul it, the
State legislation is valid and effectual. What is there to recommend a
construction which leads to a result like this? Here would be a
perpetual hostility; one legislature enacting laws, till another
legislature should repeal them; one sovereign power giving the rule,
till another sovereign power should abrogate it; and all this under the
idea of concurrent legislation!

But, further, under this concurrent power, the State does that which
Congress cannot do; that is, it gives preferences to the citizens of
some States over those of others. I do not mean here the advantages
conferred by the grant on the grantees; but the disadvantages to which
it subjects all the other citizens of New York. To impose an
extraordinary tax on steam navigation visiting the ports of New York,
and leaving it free everywhere else, is giving a preference to the
citizens of other States over those of New York. This Congress could not
do; and yet the State does it; so that this power, at first subordinate,
then concurrent, now becomes paramount.

The people of New York have a right to be protected against this
monopoly. It is one of the objects for which they agreed to this
Constitution, that they should stand on an equality in commercial
regul