The court below seems to me, with great deference, to have mistaken the
object and nature of the license. It seems to have been of opinion, that
the license has no other intent or effect than to ascertain the
ownership and character of the vessel. But this is the peculiar office
and object of the enrolment. That document ascertains that the regular
proof of ownership and character has been given; and the license is
given to confer the right to which the party has shown himself entitled.
It is the authority which the master carries with him, to prove his
right to navigate freely the waters of the United States, and to carry
on the coasting trade.
In some of the discussions which have been had on this question, it has
been said, that Congress has only provided for ascertaining the
ownership and property of vessels, but has not prescribed to what use
they may be applied. But this is an obvious error. The whole object of
the act regulating the coasting trade is to declare what vessels shall
enjoy the benefit of being employed in that trade. To secure this use to
certain vessels, and to deny it to others, is precisely the purpose for
which the act was passed. The error, or what I humbly suppose to be the
error, in the judgment of the court below, consists in that court's
having thought, that, although Congress might act, it had not yet acted,
in such a way as to confer a right on the appellant; whereas, if a right
was not given by this law, it never could be given. No law can be more
express. It has been admitted, that, supposing there is a provision in
the act of Congress, that all vessels duly licensed shall be at liberty
to navigate, for the purpose of trade and commerce, all the navigable
harbors, bays, rivers, and lakes within the several States, any law of
the States creating particular privileges as to any particular class of
vessels to the contrary notwithstanding, the only question that could
arise, in such a case, would be, whether the law was constitutional; and
that, if that was to be granted or decided, it would certainly, in all
courts and places, overrule and set aside the State grant.
Now, I do not see that such supposed case could be distinguished from
the present. We show a provision in an act of Congress, that all
vessels, duly licensed, may carry on the coasting trade; nobody doubts
the constitutional validity of that law; and we show that this vessel
was duly licensed according to its provisions. Thi
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