s is all that is
essential in the case supposed. The presence or absence of a _non
obstante_ clause cannot affect the extent or operation of the act of
Congress. Congress has no power of revoking State laws, as a distinct
power. It legislates over subjects; and over those subjects which are
within its power, its legislation is supreme, and necessarily overrules
all inconsistent or repugnant State legislation. If Congress were to
pass an act expressly revoking or annulling, in whole or in part, this
New York grant, such an act would be wholly useless and inoperative. If
the New York grant be opposed to, or inconsistent with, any
constitutional power which Congress has exercised, then, so far as the
incompatibility exists, the grant is nugatory and void, necessarily, and
by reason of the supremacy of the law of Congress. But if the grant be
not inconsistent with any exercise of the powers of Congress, then,
certainly, Congress has no authority to revoke or annul it. Such an act
of Congress, therefore, would be either unconstitutional or
supererogatory. The laws of Congress need no _non obstante_ clause. The
Constitution makes them supreme, when State laws come into opposition to
them. So that in these cases there is no question except this; whether
there be, or be not, a repugnancy or hostility between the law of
Congress and the law of the State. Nor is it at all material, in this
view, whether the law of the State be a law regulating commerce, or a
law of police, nor by what other name or character it may be designated.
If its provisions be inconsistent with an act of Congress, they are
void, so far as that inconsistency extends. The whole argument,
therefore, is substantially and effectually given up, when it is
admitted that Congress might, by express terms, abrogate the State
grant, or declare that it should not stand in the way of its own
legislation; because such express terms would add nothing to the effect
and operation of an act of Congress.
I contend, therefore, upon the whole of this point, that a case of
actual collision has been made out between the State grant and the act
of Congress; and as the act of Congress is entirely unexceptionable, and
clearly in pursuance of its constitutional powers, the State grant must
yield.
There are other provisions of the Constitution of the United States,
which have more or less bearing on this question. "No State shall,
without the consent of Congress, lay any duty of
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