ble to occupy some of the Insurgent trenches. On
July 29 Arevalo telegraphed Aguinaldo as follows:--

"In conference with General Greene I asked for an official
letter, a copy of which I send you: 'Headquarters 2nd Brigade,
U. S. Expeditionary Forces, Camp Dewey, near Manila, July 29th,
1898. _El Senor Noriel, General de Brigade_. Sir: In pursuance of our
conversation of yesterday and the message which Captain Arevalo brought
to me during the night, I beg to inform you that my troops will occupy
the intrenchments between the Camino Real and the beach, leaving camp
for that purpose at 8.00 o'clock this morning. I will be obliged if you
will give the necessary orders for the withdrawal of your men. Thanking
you for your courtesy, I remain, very respectfully, your obedient
servant, _F. V. Greene, Brigadier General_, commanding.'" [126]

This clear direct declaration of intention by General Greene is the
actual transaction referred to by Blount as "Jockeying the Insurgents
out of their trenches." He bases his statements concerning the matter
on a newspaper report.

The attitude of the army officers in the matter of obtaining permission
to occupy the trenches needed in preparing for the assault on the
city could not have been more correct.

On August 10 General Merritt gave the following emphatic instructions
relative to the matter:--

"No rupture with Insurgents. This is imperative. Can ask Insurgent
generals or Aguinaldo for permission to occupy their trenches, but
if refused not to use force."

On the same day General Anderson wrote to Aguinaldo, asking
permission to occupy a trench facing blockhouse No. 14, in order
to place artillery to destroy it. The permission was granted on the
following day.

During the early part of August, Aguinaldo seems to have avoided
conferences with American officers. On the second of the month Mabini
wrote him how he had put off Admiral Dewey's aid with a false statement
that he did not know Aguinaldo's whereabouts. [127]

The landing of American troops at Paranaque for the assault on Manila
led to the concentration of Insurgent troops at the neighbouring town
of Bacoor. [128]

On August 8 Fernando Acevedo [129] wrote to General Pio del Pilar
that the Americans were going to attack the next day and that,--

"It is requisite and necessary before their attack takes place
to-morrow, that you to-morrow or to-night annihilate them, sparing
none, for the way they have deceived us, an