rvices as a subordinate military leader, and as my
instructions from the President fully contemplated the occupation of
the islands by the American land forces, and stated that "the powers of
the military occupant are absolute and supreme and immediately operate
upon the political condition of the inhabitants," I did not consider it
wise to hold any direct communication with the insurgent leader until
I should be in possession of the city of Manila, especially as I would
not until then be in a position to issue a proclamation and enforce
my authority in the event that his pretensions should clash with my
designs. For these reasons the preparations for the attack on the city
were pressed and the military operations conducted without reference
to the situation of the insurgent forces. The wisdom of this course
was subsequently fully established by the fact that when the troops
at my command carried the Spanish entrenchments, extending from the
sea to the Pasay road on the extreme Spanish right, we were under no
obligation, by prearranged plans of the mutual attack, to turn to the
right and clear the front still held by the insurgents, but were able
to move forward at once and occupy the city and the suburbs.'" [183]
All that the Insurgents and the Americans ever had in common was an
enemy. They each fought that enemy in their own way. There was no
cooeperation. On the part of the Insurgents there was treachery. I
will submit further evidence of this fact.
CHAPTER IV
The Premeditated Insurgent Attack
It will be remembered that the minutes of the session of the Hong
Kong junta at which Aguinaldo reported the result of his negotiations
with Pratt and received his instructions relative to the trip to
Manila, recorded the fact that there would be no better occasion for
the expeditionary forces "to arm themselves at the expense of the
Americans," and that provided with arms the Filipino people would
be able to oppose themselves to the United States and combat their
demands if they attempted to colonize the country. [184]
The possible, if not the probable, desirability of attacking the
United States troops was, it is evident, clearly foreseen from the
beginning. Active preparations for doing this now soon began.
Although Insurgent officers in full uniform freely visited Manila at
all times, Aguinaldo wrote on October 1 to his commander in Laguna
Province that he must not permit Americans there without passes. He
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