to suppose that it is in our power at any moment, by
friendly influence of reasoning, to solve the problem which has brought
together in the shock of battle the two greatest military powers of
Europe.... I do not see that it is an offence on our part not to interfere
when the belligerents differ so widely, when we have not the hope of
bringing them together, and when we cannot adopt without reserve the
language and claims of either." Material responsibility and moral
responsibility both pointed to a rigid equity between the combatants, and
to strict neutrality. The utmost to be done was to localise the war; and
with this aim, the British cabinet induced Italy, Austria, Russia, and
smaller powers to come to a common agreement that none of them would
depart from neutrality without a previous understanding with the rest.
This league of the neutrals, though negative, was at least a shadow of
collective action, from which good might come if the belligerents should
some day accept or invite mediation. To this diplomatic neutrality the
only alternative was an armed neutrality, and armed neutrality has not
always served pacific ends.
To the German contention at one stage after the overthrow of the empire,
that the Empress was still the only authority existing legally for France,
Mr. Gladstone was energetically opposed. "It embodied," he said, "the
doctrine that no country can have a new government without the consent of
the old one." "Ought we," he asked Lord Granville (Sept. 20), "to witness
in silence the promulgation of such a doctrine, which is utterly opposed
to the modern notions of public right, though it was in vogue fifty years
back, and though it was acted on with most fatal consequences by the
Prussians of eighty years back?" Then as for mediation, whether isolated
or in common, he saw no hope in it. He said to the Duke of Argyll (Sept.
6), "I would not say a word ever so gently. I believe it would do great
mischief. As at present advised, I see but two really safe grounds for
mediation, (1) a drawn battle; (2) the request of both parties." Ever
since 1862, and his error in the American war--so he now wrote to Lord
Granville--"in forming and expressing an opinion that the Southerners had
virtually established their independence, I have been very fearful of
giving opinions with regard to the proper course of foreign nations to
pursue in junctures, of which, after all, I think they have better means
of forming a judgme
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