ccasionally advanced or supported contentions thought by the
Englishmen to be almost amusing. For instance, Mr. Sumner in a memorandum
(Jan. 17, 1871) to Mr. Fish, had submitted a singular species of political
syllogism. He desired nothing so much, he said, as that entire goodwill
should prevail between Great Britain and the United States, and that the
settlement should be complete. Now the greatest trouble and peril in the
way of a complete settlement was Fenianism; Fenianism was excited by the
proximity of the British flag over the Canadian border; therefore, the
British flag should be withdrawn from the whole hemisphere, including the
islands, and the American flag should fly in its stead. In conformity with
this tight and simple chain of reasoning, Mr. Fish threw out a hint to
Lord de Grey that the cession of Canada might end the quarrel. The English
envoy contented himself with the dry remark that he did not find such a
suggestion in his instructions.(261)

Though sometimes amused, the commissioners soon understood that at heart
the American negotiators desired to settle. Difficulties with their own
people were great. A presidential campaign with all its necessities
approached. A settlement of outstanding accounts with England might be a
good card to play in the election; on the other hand, if the peace card
were not available, it was just possible that a war card might do nearly
as well. Mr. Fish was mortally afraid of Sumner, who had been chairman of
the foreign relations committee in the senate, and whose anti-English
temper, as we have seen, was red-hot. The constitutional requirement of a
two-thirds majority in the senate for the ratification of a treaty was
awkward and menacing, and it was necessary to secure dubious senators by
the exhibition of high national temper on the public stage. It is
interesting to note, in passing, that the English visitors were persuaded
how much better it would have been if, according to our own parliamentary
system at Westminster, the American system had allowed Mr. Fish to meet
Mr. Sumner on the floor of congress, and instead of seeking victory by
unseen manipulation, fight the battle out before the country.

(M132) The British commissioners were almost as much embarrassed by their
friends at home as by their friends or foes at Washington. Both ministers
and lawyers, from the safe distance of Downing Street, were sometimes
excessive in pressing small and trivial alterations, whi