Italy.

In a cabinet memorandum (Jan. 3, 1860), he declared himself bound in
candour to admit that the Emperor had shown, "though partial and
inconsistent, indications of a genuine feeling for the Italians--and far
beyond this he has committed himself very considerably to the Italian
cause in the face of the world. When in reply to all that, we fling in his
face the truce of Villafranca, he may reply--and the answer is not without
force--that he stood single-handed in a cause when any moment Europe might
have stood combined against him. We gave him verbal sympathy and
encouragement, or at least criticism; no one else gave him anything at
all. No doubt he showed then that he had undertaken a work to which his
powers were unequal; but I do not think that, when fairly judged, he can
be said to have given proof by that measure of insincerity or
indifference." This was no more than justice, it is even less; and both
Italians and Englishmen have perhaps been too ready to forget that the
freedom of Italy would have remained an empty hope if Napoleon iii. had
not unsheathed his sword.

(M6) After discussing details, Mr. Gladstone laid down in his memorandum a
general maxim for the times, that "the alliance with France is the true
basis of peace in Europe, for England and France never will unite in any
European purpose which is radically unjust." He put the same view in a
letter to Lacaita a few months later (Sept. 16): "A close alliance between
England and France cannot be used for mischief, and cannot provoke any
dangerous counter combination; but a close alliance between England and
other powers would provoke a dangerous counter combination immediately,
besides that it could not in itself be trusted. My own leaning, therefore,
is not indeed to place reliance on the French Emperor, but to interpret
him candidly, and in Italian matters especially to recollect the great
difficulties in which he is placed, (1) because, whether by his own fault
or not, he cannot reckon upon strong support from England when he takes a
right course. (2) Because he has his own ultramontane party in France to
deal with, whom, especially if not well supported abroad, he cannot afford
to defy."

As everybody soon saw, it was the relation of Louis Napoleon to the French
ultramontanes that constituted the tremendous hazard of the Piedmontese
invasion of the territories of the pope. This critical proceeding
committed Cavour to a startling change, a