in his zeal for the treaty and its connection with tariff
reform, Mr. Gladstone believed that the operation would open a great
volume of trade and largely enrich the country. But in one sense this was
the least of it:--

I had a reason of a higher order. The French Emperor had launched
his project as to Savoy and Nice. It should have been plain to all
those who desired an united Italy, that such an Italy ought not to
draw Savoy in its wake; a country severed from it by the
mountains, by language, by climate, and I suppose by pursuits. But
it does not follow that Savoy should have been tacked on to
France, while for the annexation of Nice it was difficult to find
a word of apology. But it could scarcely be said to concern our
interests, while there was not the shadow of a case of honour. The
susceptibilities of England were, however, violently aroused. Even
Lord Russell used imprudent language in parliament about looking
for other allies. A French panic prevailed as strong as any of the
other panics that have done so much discredit to this country. For
this panic, the treaty of commerce with France was the only
sedative. It was in fact a counter-irritant; and it aroused the
sense of commercial interest to counteract the war passion. It was
and is my opinion, that the choice lay between the Cobden treaty
and not the certainty, but the high probability, of a war with
France. (_Undated memo._)

II

Out of the commercial treaty grew the whole of the great financial scheme
of 1860. By his first budget Mr. Gladstone had marked out this year for a
notable epoch in finance. Happily it found him at the exchequer. The
expiry of certain annuities payable to the public creditor removed a
charge of some two millions, and Mr. Gladstone was vehemently resolved
that this amount should not "pass into the great gulf of expenditure there
to be swallowed up." If the year, in such circumstances, is to pass, he
said to Cobden, "without anything done for trade and the masses, it will
be a great discredit and a great calamity." The alterations of duty
required for the French treaty were made possible by the lapse of the
annuities, and laid the foundation of a plan that averted the discredit
and calamity of doing nothing for trade, and nothing for the masses of the
population. France engaged to reduce duties and remove prohibitions on a
long list of articles o