lowed,
and in the case of Hegelianism, a complete collapse. Even at Berlin
the popularity of Hegelianism came suddenly to an end, and after a
time no truly scientific man liked to be called a Hegelian. These
sudden collapses in Germany are very instructive. As long as a German
professor is at the head of affairs and can do something for his
pupils, his pupils are very loud in their encomiums, both in public
and in private. They not only exalt him, but help to belittle all who
differ from him. So it was with Hegel, so it was at a later time with
Bopp, and Curtius, and other professors, particularly if they had the
ear of the Minister of Education. But soon after the death of these
men, particularly if another influential star was rising, the change
of tone was most sudden and most surprising; even the sale of their
books dwindled down, and they were referred to only as landmarks,
showing the rapid advance made by living celebrities. Perhaps all this
cannot be helped, as long as human nature is what it is, but it is
nevertheless painful to observe.

I had the good fortune of becoming acquainted with Hegelianism through
Professor Christian Weisse at Leipzig, who, though he was considered a
Hegelian, was a very sober Hegelian, a critic quite as much as an
admirer of Hegel. He had a very small audience, because his manner of
lecturing was certainly most trying and tantalizing. But by being
brought into personal contact with him one was able to get help from
him wherever he could give it. Though Weisse was convinced of the
truth of Hegel's Dialectic Method, he often differed from him in its
application. This Dialectic Method consisted in showing how thought is
constantly and irresistibly driven from an affirmative to a negative
position, then reconciles the two opposites, and from that point
starts afresh, repeating once more the same process. Pure being, for
instance, from which Hegel's ideal evolution starts, was shown to be
the same as empty being, that is to say, nothing, and both were
presented as identical, and in their identity giving us the new
concept of Becoming (_Werden_), which is being and not-being at the
same time. All this may appear to the lay reader rather obscure, but
could not well be passed over.

So far Weisse followed the great thinker, and I possess still, in his
own writing, the picture of a ladder on which the intellect is
represented as climbing higher and higher from the lowest concept to
the hi