conviction of the judgment, we call
prudence; a virtue of so much consequence to all the other virtues; a
virtue of so much consequence to ourselves and to our friends, that it
surely merits a whole chapter to itself in Practical Education.

FOOTNOTES:

[85] V. Chapter on Attention.

[86] V. Tasks.

[87] Chapter on Acquaintance.

[88] V. Stewart.

[89] A Naturalist's Calendar, by the late Rev. Gilbert White, M. A.
published by Dr. Aikin, printed for B. and J. White, Fleet Street.

[90] V. Deinology; where there are many entertaining examples of the
figures of rhetoric.

[91] Une demonstration est donc une suite de propositions, ou les
memes idees passant de l'une a l'autre, ne different que parce
qu'elles sont enoncees differement; et l'evidence d'un raisonnement
consiste uniquement dans l'identite. V. Art de Raisonner, p. 2.

[92] V. Chapter on Books.

[93] V. Chapter on Imagination.

[94] V. Attention.

[95] Locke. Essay on the Conduct of the Human Understanding.

CHAPTER XXIV.

ON PRUDENCE AND ECONOMY.

Voltaire says, that the king of Prussia always wrote with one kind of
enthusiasm, and acted with another. It often happens, that men judge
with one degree of understanding, and conduct themselves with
another;[96] hence the common-place remarks on the difference between
theory and practice; hence the observation, that it is easy to be
prudent for other people, but extremely difficult to be prudent for
ourselves. Prudence is a virtue compounded of judgment and resolution:
we do not here speak of that narrow species of prudence, which is more
properly called worldly wisdom; but we mean that enlarged,
comprehensive wisdom, which, after taking a calm view of the objects
of happiness, steadily prefers the greatest portion of felicity. This
is not a selfish virtue; for, according to our definition,
benevolence, as one of the greatest sources of our pleasures, must be
included in the truly prudent man's estimate. Two things are necessary
to make any person prudent, the power to judge, and the habit of
acting in consequence of his conviction. We have, in the preceding
chapter, as far as we were able, suggested the best methods of
cultivating the powers of reasoning in our pupils; we must consider
now how these can be applied immediately to their conduct, and
associated with habits of action.

Instead of deciding always for our young pupils, we should early
accustom them to choose for themselves