w Orleans; an omission that
carried the grave responsibility for loss of that city, and for the far
graver disaster of the closing of the whole river and the blockade of
the trans-Mississippi. For had the "Louisiana" been furnished with two
companion ships of equal strength--or even had she been completely
finished and not had been compelled to succumb to accidents within,
while she braved the terrific fire from without--the Federal fleet
might have been crushed like egg-shells; the splendid exertions of
Hollins and Kennon in the past would not have been nullified; the blood
of McIntosh and Huger would not have been useless sacrifice; and the
homes of the smiling city and the pure vicinage of her noble daughters
might not have been polluted by the presence of the commandant, who
crawled in after the victorious fleet.

Norfolk, however, had come into southern possession, by the secession
of Virginia; and the vast resources of her navy-yard--only partly
crippled by the haste of the Federal retreat--stimulated the
Government. A meager appropriation was passed for the construction of
the "Merrimac;" or rather for an iron-clad ship upon the hull of the
half-destroyed frigate of that name. Had the whole amount necessary for
her completion been given, the vessel would have been ready weeks
before she was, under the dribblet system adopted. Then, indeed, it
would be hard to overestimate her value; damage to shipping in Hampton
Roads; or her ultimate effect upon McClellan's campaign.

No appropriation for an object of vital import could be shaken free
from its bonds of red tape; and this one was saddled with an incubus,
in the bill for the "construction of one hundred gunboats." The scheme
to build that number of wooden vessels of small size seemed equally
short-sighted and impracticable. They could only be built on inland
rivers and creeks, to prevent attacks by the enemy's heavier vessels;
and hence they were necessarily small and ineffective. The interior
navy-yards had, moreover, to be guarded against surprises by the
enemy's cavalry; and as men were so scarce, it was generally arranged
that the navy-yard should follow the army lines. Constantly shifting
position--caused by the rapid movements of the enemy, left these
impromptu ship-yards unprotected; and then a small party of raiders
would either burn them, or force their builders to do so. It was not
until the appropriation was nearly spent--although _not one efficient_