f this, the Federal navy, at the end of the
second year of the war, numbered some 390 vessels of all grades,
carrying a fraction over 3,000 guns. Before the end of the war it had
increased to near 800 vessels of war of all grades; the number of guns
had doubled and were infinitely heavier and more effective; and the
number of tenders, tugs, transports and supply ships would have swelled
the navy list to over 1,300 vessels.

To meet this formidable preparation, the Confederate Navy Department in
May, '61, had _one gulf steamer_ in commission; had the fragments of
the Norfolk Navy Yard; the refuse of the harbor boats of Charleston,
New Orleans, Savannah and Mobile to select from; and had, besides, the
neglect of Congress and the jealousy of the other branch of the service.

Spite of all these drawbacks, the rare powers of the navy officers
forced themselves into notice and use.

Before the close of the war, the only two rolling-mills in the
Confederacy were in charge of navy officers. They built powder-mills
and supplied their own demands; and, to a great extent, those of the
army. They established rope-walks and became the seekers for the
invaluable stores of niter and coal that both branches of the service
so much needed. More than this, they made from nothing--and in spite of
constant losses from exposure to the enemy and incomplete supplies--a
fleet of iron-clads numbering at one time nine vessels; and a wooden
navy at the same moment reaching some thirty-five.

But these--scattered over the vast area of water courses, far from
supporting each other--were unable to cope with the superior strength
of metal and construction brought against them.

That much-discussed torpedo system, too--regarding the utility of which
there was such diversity of opinion--had its birth and perfection in
the navy. It was a service of science and perseverance; frequently of
exposure to every peril. It required culture, nerve and administrative
ability; and it was managed in the main with success. Still the results
were hardly commensurate with the outlay involved; for though James
river, some of the western streams, and Charleston harbor were
literally sown with torpedoes, yet only in rare and isolated
instances--such as the "De Kalb" and "Commodore Jones"--did the results
equal the expectation. Thousands of tons of valuable powder, much good
metal and more valuable time at the work-shops were expended on
torpedoes; and, on the whole,