de; and leaving him in
Maryland, to pass into Pennsylvania, occupy Harrisburg, destroy
communications between Washington and the North and reduce
Philadelphia.

Such, at least, was the universal belief of the southern people; and so
rapidly did their mercurial temperament rise under it, and so great was
their reliance in the army that was to accomplish the brilliant
campaign, that they looked upon it already as a fixed fact. Now, at
last, they felt, we will teach the Yankees what invasion really means.
With their Capital leaguered, their President and Cabinet fugitives by
water, and their great thoroughfare and second city in our hands, we
will dictate our own terms, and end the war.

Such _might_ have been the case, had Gettysburg been won, or had that
battle never been fought.

If Lee's intention was to flank Meade and avoid a fight at the outset
of the campaign, it was thwarted by the rapid concentration of troops
in his front, near Gettysburg. To prevent being struck in detail and
secure his communications, Lee was forced to recall Ewell and to
concentrate his army. Hill and Longstreet were ordered up from
Chambersburg; and by July 1st the opposing armies faced each other;
each feeling its way cautiously and knowing that the result of this
grapple of the giants must in a great measure decide the war. Meade's
defeat would lose Washington, leave the heart of the North open, and
demoralize the only army in that section. Lee's defeat, on the other
hand, would jeopardy his very existence and probably leave Richmond an
easy prey to fresh advance.

But in Richmond none of this was felt; for all that was known of the
army was its victorious entry into Pennsylvania; and absurdly
exaggerated stories of the dire panic and demoralization of the enemy
received perfect credence.

Then the shock came.

On the 1st of July, Hill's advance encountered the enemy under
Reynolds; and--after a fierce struggle, in which their general was
killed--drove them back into and through the town. Here they were
reformed on a semi-circular crest of hills; massing their artillery and
holding their position until dark. Their loss was heavier far than
Hill's, and the men not in as good fighting trim; but it was very late,
and General Lee feared pressing their reserve. Had he known that it was
only the advance of Meade, broken and demoralized, that held the crest,
he could undoubtedly have carried and occupied it. The fearful battles
of the ne