n the common design, and _so situated
as to be able_ in case of need _to afford assistance to those actually
engaged_, though they do not actually obstruct, resist, or oppose."
These are obstructors by construction No. 1; they must have been
several thousands in number.
But even that is not all; the judicial logic of deduction goes further
still, and he adds, "Not only those who are present, but _those who_
though _absent_ when the offence was committed, _did procure, counsel,
command, or abet_ others to commit the offence are indictable as
principals." These are obstructors by construction No. 2.
2. Next he determines what it is which "amounts to _such advising or
counselling_ another as will be sufficient to constitute this legal
element in the offence." First he constructs the physical act which is
the misdemeanor, namely, standing in the high road and thereby
hindering a kidnapper from "passing freely along that way; or being so
situated as to be able to afford assistance to others thus standing;
or advising another thus to stand, or be situated:" next he constructs
the _advice_, the metaphysical act, which is equally a "misdemeanor."
This is the square root of construction No. 2. Look at this absurd
quantity.
"_Such a procurement may be_, either by direct means, as by hire,
counsel, or command, or indirect, _by evincing an express liking,
approbation, or assent_." Thus the mere casual expression, "I wish
Burns would escape, or I wish somebody would let him out," is a
"Misdemeanor;" it is "evincing an express liking." Nodding to any
other man's similar wish is a misdemeanor. It is "approbation." Even
smiling at the nod is a crime--it is "assent." Such is the threefold
shadow of this constructive shade. But even that is not all. A man is
held responsible for what he evinced no _express_ or implied _liking_
for: "_it need not appear that the precise time, or place, or means
advised, were used_." Accordingly, he that "evinces an express
liking," "_is responsible for all that ensues upon its execution_." He
evinces his assent to the End and is legally responsible for any Means
which any hearer thereof shall, at any time, or in any place, make use
of to attain that end!
Gentlemen of the Jury, this charge is a _quo warranto_ against all
Freedom of Speech. But suppose it were good law, and suppose the
Grand-Jury obedient to it, see how it would apply.
All who evinced an express liking, approbation, or assent to
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