attack on the Marshal who had shut those doors
without any legal authority. If you decide this point as the
government wishes, then you will proceed to the next question.

2. Did I actually obstruct him? If not, then the inquiry stops here.
You answer "not guilty." But if I did, then it is worth while to
consider how I obstructed him. (1.) Was it by a physical act, by
material force; or, (2.) by a metaphysical act, immaterial or
spiritual force--a word, thought, a feeling, a wish, approbation,
assent, consent, "evincing an express liking."

3. Was Marshal Freeman, at the time of the obstruction, in the peace
of the United States, or was he himself violating the law thereof? For
if he were violating the law and thereby injuring some other man, and
I obstructed him in that injury, then I am free from all legal guilt,
and did a citizen's duty in obstructing his illegal conduct. Now it
appears that he was kidnapping and stealing Anthony Burns for the
purpose of making him the slave of one Suttle of Virginia, who wished
to sell him and acquire money thereby; and that Mr. Freeman did this
at the instigation of Commissioner Loring who was entitled to receive
ten dollars if he enslaved Mr. Burns, and five only for setting him
free. It appears also that Marshal Freeman was to receive large,
official money for this kidnapping, and such honor as this
Administration, and the Hunker newspapers, and lower law divines can
bestow.

Now you are to consider whether a man so doing was in the peace of the
United States. He professes to have acted under the fugitive slave
bill which authorizes him to seize, kidnap, steal, imprison, and carry
off any person whatsoever, on the oath of any slaveholder who has
fortified himself with a piece of paper of a certain form and tenor
from any court of slaveholders in the slave States. Is that bill
Constitutional? The Constitution of the United States is the People's
Power of Attorney by which they authorize certain servants, called
Legislative, Judicial, and Executive officers, to do certain matters
and things in a certain way, but prohibit them from doing in the name
of the People, any thing except those things specified, or those in
any but the way pointed out. Does the fugitive slave bill attempt
those things and only those, in the way provided for in that Power of
Attorney; or other things, or in a different way?

To determine this compound question you will look (1.) at the ultimate
Purpose