ner appointed by the Judge of the Court as a ministerial
officer to take "bail and affidavits," and paid twice as much for
stealing a victim as for setting free a man, is either such a
"supreme" or such an "inferior court" as the Constitution vests the
"judicial powers" in. If not, then the fugitive slave bill is
unconstitutional because it does not use the Means which the People's
Power of Attorney points out. Of course the inquiry stops at this
point, and you return "not guilty."

4. It is claimed that the fugitive slave bill is sustained by this
clause in the Constitution, "No person held to service or labor in one
State, under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in
consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such
service or labor, but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to
whom such service or labor may be due."[225] But if you try the
fugitive slave bill by this rule, you must settle two questions. (1.)
Who is meant by persons "held to service or labor?" and (2.) by whom
shall they "be delivered up on claim?" Let us begin with the first.

[Footnote 225: Art. iv. Sec. 2, P. 2.]

(1.) Who are the persons "held to service or labor?" The preamble to
this People's Power of Attorney, sets forth the matters and things
which the People's agents are empowered to achieve. "They are to form
a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquillity,
provide for the common Defence, promote the General Welfare and secure
the Blessings of Liberty." Now the fugitive-from-labor clause must be
interpreted in part by the light of the Purpose of the Constitution.
So it would appear that this Power of Attorney, requires the delivery
of only such as are _justly_ "held to service or labor;" and only to
those men to whom this "service" is _justly_ "due." Surely, it would
be a monstrous act to deliver up to his master a person _unjustly_
"held to service or labor," or one justly held to those to whom his
service was not _justly_ due: it would be as bad to deliver up the
_wrong fugitive_, as to deliver the right fugitive to the _wrong
claimant_: it would be also monstrous to suppose that the People of
the United States, with the Declaration of Independence in their
memory, should empower their attorneys to deliver up a man _unjustly_
held to service or labor, and that too by the very instrument which
directs them to "establish Justice" and "secure the Blessings of
Liberty." Whatsoever