the instant that the increasing refinement or
finish of the picture begins to be paid for by the loss of the faintest
shadow of an idea, that instant all refinement or finish is an
excrescence, and a deformity.

Sec. 8. Yet there are certain ideas belonging to language itself.

Sec. 9. The definition.

Yet although in all our speculations on art, language is thus to be
distinguished from, and held subordinate to, that which it conveys, we
must still remember that there are certain ideas inherent in language
itself, and that strictly speaking, every pleasure connected with art
has in it some reference to the intellect. The mere sensual pleasure of
the eye, received from the most brilliant piece of coloring, is as
nothing to that which it receives from a crystal prism, except as it
depends on our perception of a certain meaning and intended arrangement
of color, which has been the subject of intellect. Nay, the term idea,
according to Locke's definition of it, will extend even to the sensual
impressions themselves as far as they are "things which the mind
occupies itself about in thinking," that is, not as they are felt by the
eye only, but as they are received by the mind through the eye. So that,
if I say that the greatest picture is that which conveys to the mind of
the spectator the greatest number of the greatest ideas, I have a
definition which will include as subjects of comparison every pleasure
which art is capable of conveying. If I were to say, on the contrary,
that the best picture was that which most closely imitated nature, I
should assume that art could only please by imitating nature, and I
should cast out of the pale of criticism those parts of works of art
which are not imitative, that is to say, intrinsic beauties of color and
form, and those works of art wholly, which, like the arabesques of
Raffaelle in the Loggias, are not imitative at all. Now I want a
definition of art wide enough to include all its varieties of aim: I do
not say therefore that the art is greatest which gives most pleasure,
because perhaps there is some art whose end is to teach, and not to
please. I do not say that the art is greatest which teaches us most,
because perhaps there is some art whose end is to please, and not to
teach. I do not say that the art is greatest which imitates best,
because perhaps there is some art whose end is to create, and not to
imitate. But I say that the art is greatest, which conveys to the min