istinctiveness, not the universality of the truth, which renders it
important. And the so-called particular idea is unimportant, not
because it is not predicable of the whole species, but because it _is_
predicable of things out of that species. It is not its individuality,
but its generality which renders it unimportant. So, then, truths are
important just in proportion as they are characteristic, and are
valuable, primarily, as they separate the species from all other created
things secondarily, as they separate the individuals of that species
from one another: thus "silken" or "woollen" are unimportant ideas with
respect to drapery, because they neither separate the species from other
things, nor even the individuals of that species from one another,
since, though not common to the whole of it, they are common to
indefinite numbers of it; but the particular folds into which any piece
of drapery may happen to fall, being different in many particulars from
those into which any other piece of drapery will fall, are expressive
not only of the characters of the species, flexibility, (non-elasticity,
etc.,) but of individuality and definite character in the case
immediately observed, and are consequently most important and necessary
ideas. So in a man, to be short-legged or long-nosed or anything else of
accidental quality, does not distinguish him from other short-legged or
long-nosed animals; but the important truths respecting a man are,
first, the marked development of that distinctive organization which
separates him as man from other animals, and secondly, that group of
qualities which distinguish the individual from all other men, which
make him Paul or Judas, Newton or Shakspeare.

Sec. 7. Otherwise truths of species are valuable because beautiful.

Such are the real sources of importance in truths as far as they are
considered with reference merely to their being general, or particular;
but there are other sources of importance which give farther weight to
the ordinary opinion of the greater value of those which are general,
and which render this opinion right in practice; I mean the intrinsic
beauty of the truths themselves, a quality which it is not here the
place to investigate, but which must just be noticed, as invariably
adding value to truths of species rather than to those of individuality.
The qualities and properties which characterize man or any other animal
as a species, are the perfection of his or