other, in the despotism of a single man.

The people of the ancient world had no knowledge of a monarchy founded
on a nobility, and still less knowledge of a monarchy founded on a
legislative corporation formed, as in England, by the representatives of
the people. On reading the admirable work of Tacitus on the ancient
Germans, one sees that it is from them that the English have derived the
idea of their political system. This fine form of government was
discovered in the forests. It is based on a separation of the three
powers found in every state--the legislative power, the executive power,
and the judicial power. The first is in the hands of the parliament, the
second is in the hands of the monarch, and the third in the hands of the
magistracy. The English people would lose their liberty if the same man,
or the same corporation, or the lords, or the people themselves, were
possessed of these three powers.

By their representative system the English have avoided the great defect
of the ancient republics, in which the populace were allowed to take an
active part in the government.

There is in every state a number of persons distinguished by birth,
wealth, or honour. If they were confounded among the people, and had
there only one vote like the rest, the common liberty would be to them a
slavery, and they would have no interest in defending it, because most
of the laws would be directed against them. The part they play in
legislation should, therefore, be proportionate to the other advantages
which they have in the state. In England they rightly form a legislative
body, which has the power of arresting the enterprises of the people,
in the same way as the people have the power of arresting theirs. A
house of lords must be hereditary. It is so naturally, and, besides,
this gives it a very great interest in the preservation of its
prerogatives, which, in a free country, must always be in danger. But as
an hereditary power might be tempted to follow its private interests to
the neglect of the public welfare, it is necessary that in matters in
which corruption can easily arise, such as matters relating to money
bills, the House of Lords should have neither any initiating nor any
correcting faculty; it should have only a power of veto and a power of
approving, like the tribunes of ancient Rome.

The cabinet should not wield the executive power as well as the
legislative power. Unless the monarch himself retains the exec