cieties, it is the accord of these
interests that has rendered such societies possible.

I maintain, then, that sovereignty, being the exercise of the general
will, cannot be alienated, and that the sovereign, which is simply a
collective being, cannot be represented save by itself; it may transfer
its power, but not its will.

For the same reason that sovereignty is inalienable, it is indivisible.
For the will is either general or it is not. If it is general, it is,
when declared, an act of the people, and becomes law; if it is not
general, it is, when declared, merely an act of a particular person or
persons, not of the sovereign.

The general will is infallible; but the deliberations of the people are
not necessarily so. The people may be, and often are, deceived.
Particular interests may gain an advantage over general interests, and
in that case the rival particular interests should be allowed to destroy
each other, so that the true general interest may prevail. In order to
secure the clear expression of the general will, there should be no
parties or groups within the state; if such groups exist, they should be
multiplied in number, so that no one party should get the upper hand.

While, under the contract, each person alienates his power, his goods,
and his liberty, he only alienates so much of these as are of concern to
the community; but it belongs to the sovereign to determine what is of
concern to the community and what is not.

Whatsoever services a citizen owes to the state, he owes them directly
the sovereign demands them; but the sovereign, on its part, must not
charge its citizens with any obligations useless to the community; for,
under the law of reason, nothing is done without cause, any more than
under the law of nature. The general will, let it be repeated, tends
always to public utility, and is intrinsically incapable of demanding
services not useful to the public.

A law is an expression of a general will, and must be general in its
terms and import. The sovereign cannot legislate for part of the
individuals composing the state, for if it did so the general will would
enter into a particular relation with particular people, and that is
contrary to its nature. The law may thus confer privileges, but must not
name the persons to whom the privileges are to belong. It may establish
a royal government, but must not nominate a king. Any function relating
to an individual object does not appertain t