previous few days to bother much about
the German army, and at the time I knew little more about that
formidable fighting machine than what was told in books of reference
like the _Statesman's Year-book_, which gave full particulars about
First Line Troops, but said uncommonly little about Reserve
Formations. Information with regard to these could only be obtained
from secret sources. What we were told by Dallas was a revelation to
me. There seemed to be no end to the enemy's fighting resources. He
kept on producing fresh batches of Reserve Divisions and Extra-Reserve
Divisions, like a conjurer who produces huge glass bowls full of
goldfish out of his waistcoat pocket. He seemed to be doing it on
purpose--one felt quite angry with the man. But it was made plain to
me that we were up against a tougher proposition than I had imagined.
The Field-Marshal must have been, or at all events ought to have been,
perfectly well aware of all this, seeing that he had been C.I.G.S. up
till very recently, and had devoted special attention to the problems
involved in a war with Germany.

In a foot-note near the end of "_1914_," Lord French mentions having,
on some occasion during the few days when war was still trembling in
the balance, suggested to Lord Kitchener that they should repair
together to the Prime Minister and propose that Lord Kitchener should
be commander-in-chief of the field army, with him (French) as Chief of
Staff. That was a self-sacrificing suggestion; but it surely indicates
an absence of what Lord Haldane calls "clear thinking." Sir J. French
had been organizing and training the Expeditionary Force for some
years previously, knew all about it, was acquainted with its generals
and staffs, was up-to-date in connection with progress in tactical
details, and had studied the strategical situation in Belgium and
France. Lord Kitchener had, on the other hand, been in civil
employment and out of touch with most military questions for some
considerable time previously. Lord Kitchener would have been thrown
away commanding the Expeditionary Force. He was needed for the much
more important position which he actually took up.

CHAPTER II

EARLY DAYS AT THE WAR OFFICE

Plan of issuing _communiques_ given up owing to the disposition
to conceal reverses that manifested itself -- Direct telephonic
communication with the battlefield in Belgium -- A strange
attempt to withhold news as to the fall of B