by the States. He used
his influence, which was commanding, to induce the Southern States to
accept it in good faith. But he saw, as others had seen before him,
that this was not going far enough to satisfy the reasonable desire of
many in the North whom he felt it necessary to conciliate. To
emancipate the negro and conceded to him no possible power wherewith to
protect his freedom would, in the judgment of many Northern
philanthropists, prove the merest mockery of justice. This sentiment
wrought on Mr. Johnson so powerfully that against his own wish he was
compelled to address a circular to his provisional governors,
suggesting that the elective franchise should be extended to all
persons of color "who can read the Constitution of the United States,
and write their names, and also to those who own real estate valued at
not less than two hundred and fifty dollar, and pay taxes thereon."

In writing to Governor Sharkey of Mississippi in relation to this
subject the President argued that his recommendations touching colored
suffrage could be adopted "with perfect safety," and that thereby "the
Southern States would be placed, with reference to free persons of
color, upon the same basis with the free States." That Mr. Johnson
made this recommendation simply from policy and not from any proper
conception of its inherent justice is indicated by the closing
paragraph in his letter to Governor Sharkey. Indeed, by imprudent
language the President made an unnecessary exposure of the character
of his motives, and deprived himself of much of the credit which might
otherwise have belonged to him. "I hope and trust," he wrote to his
Mississippi governor, "that your convention will do this, and as a
consequence the Radicals, who are wild upon negro franchise, will be
completely foiled in their attempt to keep the Southern States from
renewing their relations to the Union by not accepting their senators
and representatives."

At this period the President did not contemplate a break with the
Republican party, much less a coalition with its opponents. He had the
vanity to believe, or was at least under the delusion of believing that
--with the exception of those whom he denominated Radicals--he could
induce the party to follow him. Mr. Seward had undoubtedly influenced
him to this conclusion, as the Secretary of State indulged the same
hopeful anticipation himself. The President seemed to have no
comprehension of the fact