us consequences of this conduct were on a
scale corresponding to the theatre of action. Life and property were
both swallowed up, leaving behind a deep-seated sense of enormous
wrong, as yet unatoned and even unacknowledged, which is one of the
chief factors in the problem now presented to the statesmen of both
countries. . . . The truth must be told, not in anger, but in sadness.
England has done to the United States an injury most difficult to
measure. Considering when it was done and in what complicity, it is
most unaccountable. At a great epoch of history, not less momentous
than that of the French Revolution or that of the Reformation, when
civilization was fighting a last battle with slavery, England gave
her influence, her material resources, to the wicked cause, and
flung a sword into the scale with slavery."

President Grant was in full sympathy with the Senate in its prompt
rejection of the Johnson-Clarendon treaty, and in his annual message to
Congress in the ensuing December (1869) he expressed his entire dissent
from its provisions.(4) He thought the rejection of the treaty was
"followed by a state of public opinion on both sides not favorable to
an immediate attempt at renewed negotiation," and expressed "the hope
that the time will soon arrive when the two Governments can approach
the solution of this momentous question, with an appreciation of what
is due to the rights, dignity, and honor of each."

The rejection of the Johnson-Clarendon treaty was formally announced
to the British Government through Mr. Motley, who succeeded Mr.
Johnson as Minister in London. Mr. Fish, in his letter of
instructions, suggested to Mr. Motley the propriety of suspending
negotiations for the present on the whole question. At the same time
he committed the Government of the United States anew to the
maintenance of the claim for National damages, as well as for the
losses of individual citizens. And thus the matter was allowed to
rest. The United States, though deeply aggrieved, did not desire to
urge the negotiation in a spirit of hostility that implied readiness
to go to war upon the issue, and simply trusted that a returning sense
of justice in the British Government would lead to a renewal of
negotiations and a friendly adjustment of all differences between the
two Governments.

A year went by and nothing was done. The English Government was not
disposed to go a step beyond the provisions of the Johnson-Claren