actions?_' Such is the question
in Dr. Tyndall's own phrases; and here, in his own phrases also, comes
his answer. '_I have no power_,' he says, '_of imagining such states
interposed between the molecules of the brain, and influencing the
transference of motion among the molecules. The thing_ eludes all mental
presentation. _But_,' he adds, '_the production of consciousness by
molecular motion is quite as unpresentable to the mental vision as the
production of molecular motion by consciousness. If I reject one result,
I reject both. I, however, reject neither, and thus stand in the
presence of two Incomprehensibles, instead of one Incomprehensible._'

Now what does all this mean? There is one meaning of which the words are
capable, which would make them perfectly clear and coherent; but that
meaning, as we shall see presently, cannot possibly be Dr. Tyndall's.
They would be perfectly clear and coherent if he meant this by
them--that the brain was a natural instrument, in the hands of a
supernatural player; but that why the instrument should be able to be
played upon, and how the player should be able to play upon it, were
both matters on which he could throw no light. But elsewhere he has told
us expressly that he does not mean this. This he expressly says is '_the
interpretation of_ grosser _minds_,' and science will not for a moment
permit us to retain it. The brain contains no '_entity usually occupied
we know not how amongst its molecules_,' but at the same time separable
from them. According to him, this is a '_heathen_' notion, and, until we
abandon it, '_no approach_,' he says, '_to the subject is possible_.'
What does he mean, then, when he tells us he rejects neither result;
when he tells us that he believes that molecular motion produces
consciousness, and also that consciousness in its turn produces
molecular motion?--when he tells us distinctly of these two that
'_observation proves them to interact_'? If such language as this means
anything, it must have reference to two distinct forces, one material
and the other immaterial. Indeed, does he not himself say so? Does he
not tell us that one of the beliefs he does not reject is the belief in
'_states of consciousness_ interposed between _the molecules of the
brain, and influencing the transference of motion among the molecules_'?
It is perfectly clear, then, that these states are not molecules; in
other words, they are not material. But if not material, what