ar motions of the
brain be yoked to this mysterious companion consciousness?_'
Here we have two views, diametrically opposed to each other, the one
suggested with approval, and the other implied as his own, by the same
writer, and in the same short essay. The first view is that
consciousness is the general property of all matter, just as motion is.
The second view is that consciousness is not the general property of
matter, but the inexplicable property of the brain only.
Here again we have a similar inconsistency. Upon one page Dr. Tyndall
says that when we have '_exhausted physics, and reached its very rim, a
mighty Mystery stills looms beyond us. We have made no step towards its
solution. And thus it will ever loom._' And on the opposite page he says
thus: '_If asked whether science has solved, or is likely in our day to
solve, the problem of the universe, I must shake my head in doubt._'
Further, I will remind the reader of Dr. Tyndall's arguments, on one
occasion, against any outside builder or creator of the material
universe. He argued that such did not exist, because his supposed action
was not definitely presentable. '_I should enquire after its shape_,' he
says:--'_Has it legs or arms? If not, I would wish it to be made clear
to me how a thing without these appliances can act so perfectly the part
of a builder?_ He challenged the theist (the theist addressed at the
time was Dr. Martineau) to give him some account of his God's workings;
and '_When he does this_,' said Dr. Tyndall, '_I shall "demand of him an
immediate exercise" of the power "of definite mental presentation."_' If
he fails here, Dr. Tyndall argues, his case is at once disproved; for
nothing exists that is not thus presentable. Let us compare this with
his dealing with the fact of consciousness. Consciousness, he admits, is
not thus presentable; and yet consciousness, he admits, exists.
Instances might be multiplied of the same vacillation and confusion of
thought--the same feminine inability to be constant to one train of
reasoning. But those just given suffice. What weight can we attach to a
man's philosophy, who after telling us that consciousness may possibly
be an inherent property of matter, of which '_the receit of reason is a
limbec only_,' adds in the same breath almost, that matter generally is
certainly not conscious, and that consciousness comes to the brain we
know not whence nor wherefore? What shall we say of a man who in one
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