to the manoeuvre makes it easy to understand that,
however well it suited the French tactics of long bowls or boarding,
it was not well adapted to the English method of close action with the
guns. With the French service it certainly continued in favour, and
the whole of Hoste's rules were reproduced by the famous naval expert
Sebastien-Francois Bigot, Vicomte de Morogues--in his elaborate
_Tactique navale, ou traits des evolutions et des signaux_,
which appeared in 1763, and was republished at Amsterdam in 1779. Not
only was he the highest French authority on naval science of his time,
but a fine seaman as well, as he proved when in command of the
_Magnifique_ on the disastrous day at Quiberon.[9]
The remainder of the new instructions, though less important than the
expansion of the Duke of York's third article, all tend in the same
direction. So far from insisting on a rigid observance of the single
line ahead in all circumstances, the new system seems to aim at
securing flexibility, and the power of concentration by independent
action of squadrons. This is to be specially noted in the new
article, No. 30, in which signals are provided for particular
squadrons and particular divisions forming line of battle abreast. It
is true that the old rigid form of an attack from windward is
retained, but, ineffective as the system proved, it was certainly not
inspired, as is so often said, by a mediaeval conception of naval
battle as a series of single ship actions. From what has been already
said, the well-considered tactical idea that underlay it is
obvious. The injunction to range the length of the enemy's line van to
van, and rear to rear, or _vice versa_, was aimed at avoiding
being doubled at either end of the line; while the injunction to bear
down together was obviously the quickest mode of bringing the whole
fleet into action without giving the enemy a chance of weathering any
part of it by 'gaining its wake.' That it was inadequate for this
purpose is well known. It would only work when the two fleets were
exactly parallel at the moment of bearing down--as was made apparent
at the battle of Malaga, where the French from leeward almost
succeeded in dividing Rooke's fleet as it bore down. Still the idea
was sound enough. The trouble was that it did not make sufficient
allowance for the unhandiness of ships of the line in those days, and
their difficulty in taking up or preserving exact formations.
As to the authorshi
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