ards. But, as we have already seen, the Duke of York's article
can hardly be construed as embodying the principle of concentration by
'breaking the line,' and 'containing.' As we know, it only applied to
an attack from the leeward which the English, and indeed every power
up to that time, did all they knew to avoid, and it cannot safely be
assumed to mean anything more than a device for gaining the wind of
part of the enemy when you cannot weather his whole fleet; while the
'containing' was intended to prevent the enemy's concentrating on the
squadron that performed the manoeuvre. Now, although Russell's
instructions lay down no rule for isolating and containing, they do
provide three new and distinct articles by which the admiral can do so
if he sees fit. Under the Duke of York's instructions, it will be
remembered, it was left to the van commander to execute the manoeuvre
of dividing the enemy's fleet as he saw his opportunity, and under
those of Lord Dartmouth it was left apparently to 'any commander.'
With all that can be said for leaving the greatest possible amount of
initiative to individual officers, such a system can hardly be called
satisfactory, and in any case so important a movement ought certainly
to be as far as possible under the control of the commander-in-chief.
But under the previous instructions he could not even initiate it by
signal. The defect had already been seen, and it will be remembered
that the additions and observations to this and the following articles
which the _Admiralty Manuscript_ contains are all directed to
remedying the omission. It is to exactly the same end that Russell's
orders seem designed, and if, as we shall see to be most probable,
they were really drawn up by Lord Torrington, we know that they were
used in this way at Beachy Head. Whether the idea of concentration and
containing was in the mind of their author we cannot tell for certain,
but at any rate the new instructions provide signals by which the
admiral can order such movements not only by any squadron, but even by
any subdivision he pleases. The freedom of individual initiative it is
true is gone, but this, as the _Admiralty MS_. indicates, was
done deliberately, not as a piece of reactionary pedantry, but as the
result of experience in battle. In all other respects the tactical
flexibility that was gained is obvious, and was fully displayed in the
first engagements in which the instructions were used.

So far as w