I
must proceed to draw a further inference.
CLEINIAS: What is it?
ATHENIAN: That the unjust man may be bad, but that he is bad against his
will. Now that an action which is voluntary should be done involuntarily
is a contradiction; wherefore he who maintains that injustice is
involuntary will deem that the unjust does injustice involuntarily.
I too admit that all men do injustice involuntarily, and if any
contentious or disputatious person says that men are unjust against
their will, and yet that many do injustice willingly, I do not agree
with him. But, then, how can I avoid being inconsistent with myself, if
you, Cleinias, and you, Megillus, say to me--Well, Stranger, if all this
be as you say, how about legislating for the city of the Magnetes--shall
we legislate or not--what do you advise? Certainly we will, I should
reply. Then will you determine for them what are voluntary and what
are involuntary crimes, and shall we make the punishments greater of
voluntary errors and crimes and less for the involuntary? or shall we
make the punishment of all to be alike, under the idea that there is no
such thing as voluntary crime?
CLEINIAS: Very good, Stranger; and what shall we say in answer to these
objections?
ATHENIAN: That is a very fair question. In the first place, let us--
CLEINIAS: Do what?
ATHENIAN: Let us remember what has been well said by us already,
that our ideas of justice are in the highest degree confused and
contradictory. Bearing this in mind, let us proceed to ask ourselves
once more whether we have discovered a way out of the difficulty. Have
we ever determined in what respect these two classes of actions differ
from one another? For in all states and by all legislators whatsoever,
two kinds of actions have been distinguished--the one, voluntary, the
other, involuntary; and they have legislated about them accordingly. But
shall this new word of ours, like an oracle of God, be only spoken, and
get away without giving any explanation or verification of itself?
How can a word not understood be the basis of legislation? Impossible.
Before proceeding to legislate, then, we must prove that they are two,
and what is the difference between them, that when we impose the penalty
upon either, every one may understand our proposal, and be able in some
way to judge whether the penalty is fitly or unfitly inflicted.
CLEINIAS: I agree with you, Stranger; for one of two things is certain:
either we must
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