etimes a person may give the name and ask the definition;
or he may give the definition and ask the name. I may illustrate what I
mean in this way.

CLEINIAS: How?

ATHENIAN: Number like some other things is capable of being divided
into equal parts; when thus divided, number is named 'even,' and the
definition of the name 'even' is 'number divisible into two equal
parts'?

CLEINIAS: True.

ATHENIAN: I mean, that when we are asked about the definition and
give the name, or when we are asked about the name and give the
definition--in either case, whether we give name or definition, we speak
of the same thing, calling 'even' the number which is divided into two
equal parts.

CLEINIAS: Quite true.

ATHENIAN: And what is the definition of that which is named 'soul'? Can
we conceive of any other than that which has been already given--the
motion which can move itself?

CLEINIAS: You mean to say that the essence which is defined as the
self-moved is the same with that which has the name soul?

ATHENIAN: Yes; and if this is true, do we still maintain that there
is anything wanting in the proof that the soul is the first origin
and moving power of all that is, or has become, or will be, and their
contraries, when she has been clearly shown to be the source of change
and motion in all things?

CLEINIAS: Certainly not; the soul as being the source of motion, has
been most satisfactorily shown to be the oldest of all things.

ATHENIAN: And is not that motion which is produced in another, by reason
of another, but never has any self-moving power at all, being in truth
the change of an inanimate body, to be reckoned second, or by any lower
number which you may prefer?

CLEINIAS: Exactly.

ATHENIAN: Then we are right, and speak the most perfect and absolute
truth, when we say that the soul is prior to the body, and that the body
is second and comes afterwards, and is born to obey the soul, which is
the ruler?

CLEINIAS: Nothing can be more true.

ATHENIAN: Do you remember our old admission, that if the soul was prior
to the body the things of the soul were also prior to those of the body?

CLEINIAS: Certainly.

ATHENIAN: Then characters and manners, and wishes and reasonings, and
true opinions, and reflections, and recollections are prior to length
and breadth and depth and strength of bodies, if the soul is prior to
the body.

CLEINIAS: To be sure.

ATHENIAN: In the next place, we must not of necessity admi